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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
ceeding involving similar facts, this question of policy was decided in favor
of the injured person.' 0 There, however, the question arose under a statute
whose whole philosophy indicated rather clearly the line of policy to be
followed in doubtful cases, and which the court was compelled by tradition
to interpret liberally. Perhaps in the instant case the court was correct in
refusing to hold the principal liable by extending further the concept of
scope of employment. Action to that end could better be taken by the
legislature. In the jurisdiction of the principal case the legislature took
action tending toward that result while the case was in litigation, passing
a statute which imposes liability on the owner of a car for the act of any
person who drives it with his consent."
V. M.
APPELLATE PRACTICE-JURISDICTIONAL AmIOUNT-INVESTMENT OF TRUST
ESTATE FUNDS-[Missouri].-The life beneficiary of a trust estate requested
the trustee under a will to invest $8,000 of the trust estate in preferred and
common stock, and $8,000 in a common trust fund. It was intended thereby
to increase the income from the trust estate by about $200 a year. The
estate was, at the time, invested wholly in corporate bonds worth $38,000.
The remaindermen of the trust estate contested the trustee's authority under
the will to make the proposed change of investments. The circuit court held
that the trustee did possess such power. An appeal was taken to the
supreme court, both parties tacitly assuming that the appeal would lie,
since the estate exceeded $7,500. Held, that the supreme court did not have
jurisdiction, because the amount in dispute was insufficient; that, since the
relief demanded was not primarily a money judgment but merely a deter-
mination of the trustee's right to make particular investments, the amount
in dispute was to be determined by the value in money of relief to the
plaintiff. Under this ruling, the contemplated increase in annual income
would determine the amount in dispute, and it clearly did not exceed $7,500.
St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Toberman.1
The broad rule adhered to by the court in reaching this decision is that
jurisdiction attaches when, and only when, the record of the trial court
affirmatively shows that there is involved an amount in controversy, inde-
pendent of all contingencies, exceeding $7,500.2 It was under this rule that
the court held that where there is involved no divestiture of the title of a
trust estate, the value of the entire estate does not determine jurisdiction.
10. Babington v. Yellow Taxi Corp. (1928) 250 N. Y. 14, 164 N. E. 726,
61 A. L. R. 1354. But cf. Kennelly v. Salt & Lumber Co. (1916) 190 Mich.
629, 157 N. W. 378 (employee ordered by fire-warden to assist in extin-
guishing forest fire).
11. D. C. Code (Supp. V, 1939) tit. 6, sec. 255b. The statute would not,
necessarily, apply to the facts of the principal case. Was the agent driving
with the principal's consent after his services had been impressed by the
police officer?
1. (Mo. 1939) 134 S. W. (2d) 45.
2. Hardt v. City Ice & Fuel Co. (1937) 340 Mo. 721, 102 S. W. (2d) 592.
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This is the view adopted in will contest cases, even where the whole estate
greatly exceeds $7,500. It is the disputed sum only that determines juris-
diction.3 In Louisiana, however, it is the value of the whole estate which
determines jurisdiction, even though the actual dispute may concern a part
that is definitely below the jurisdictional limit.4
A similar problem arises in disputes over the right to administer estates,
and over the appointment of receivers.6 Here, although the value of the
estate to be administered or of the property going into receivership may
exceed $7,500, such value is not determinative of jurisdiction. Since the
judgment would grant only temporary control and not permanent divestiture
of title, the amount in dispute is only the financial value of such temporary
control. To illustrate: in In re Wilson's Estate,7 where plaintiffs sought to
remove the administrator of an estate valued at $17,000, the court held
that the amount in dispute was only $850, this being the statutory com-
pensation allowed the administrator, and hence the value of the office.
Louisiana is contra here also, holding that it is the amount of the fund to
be administered which determines jurisdiction, rather than the value of the
office.8
The court brought up an interesting problem when it stated that, even
conceding that the life beneficiary would receive the expected annual in-
crease in net revenue from the proposed change of investment, the record
did not disclose and the court would not say that the beneficiary would live
long enough to receive more than $7,500. Does this mean that the life ex-
pectancy of the interested party may be introduced in evidence to compute
the sum in dispute? The court has never ruled definitely on this question.
In a dispute over an award of the Workmen's Compensation Commission,
where the plaintiff was awarded $20 a week for 300 weeks and $13.50 a
week for life, the court held that only $6,000 was in dispute since it was
not certain that the plaintiff would live long enough to receive an additional
$1,500. 9 However, in another Workmen's Compensation case the court, in
3. Fleischaker v. Fleischaker (1936) 338 Mo. 797, 92 S. W. (2d) 169;
Meyers v. Drake (1930) 324 Mo. 612, 24 S. W. (2d) 116.
4. In Succession of Wengert (1934) 178 La. 1077, 152 So. 747, where
only $120 was sought out of an estate of $9,000, the latter figure was held
to determine jurisdiction.
5. In re Wilson's Estate (1928) 320 Mo. 975, 8 S. W. (2d) 973.
6. Matz v. Miami Club Restaurant (1936) 339 Mo. 1133, 100 S. W. (2d)
476; Simplex Paper Co. v. Standard Corrugated Box Co. (Mo. 1934) 76
S. W. (2d) 1075; Rust v. Geneva Inv. Co. (Mo. 1939) 124 S. W. (2d)
1135.
7. (1928) 320 Mo. 975, 8 S. W. (2d) 973.
8. State ex rel. Guion v. People's Fire Ins. Co. (1910) 125 La. 983, 52
So. 120.
9. Hardt v. City Ice & Fuel Co. (1937) 340 Mo. 721, 102 S. W. (2d) 592
(no indication that mortality tables were used). See Hanley v. Carlo Motor
Service Co. (1939) 344 Mo. 267, 126 S. W. (2d) 229; Hohlstein v. St. Louis
Roofing Co. (1931) 328 Mo. 899, 42 S. W. (2d) 573. Cf. Stuart v. Stuart
(1928) 320 Mo. 486, 8 S. W. (2d) 613; Kouka v. Kouka (1906) 221 Il1.
98, 77 N. E. 556. Certain distinctions have been made, in worknen's com-
pensation disputes, between awards for permanent total disability and
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reviewing the commutation of an award, used mortality tables as one de-
vice to determine the amount in dispute.10 But, since with or without such
calculation the amount in dispute was insufficient to confer jurisdiction, this
case cannot be said to sanction the use of the tables. In Louisiana, in a
case where a life beneficiary of a trust was to receive $516 annually, it
was held no error to show that his life expectancy would cause the income
to be sufficient eventually to come within the jurisdictional amount.11
It seems that the remarks of the court in the instant case still leave
undecided its policy as to the use of mortality tables in such litigation.
R. W. K.
BANKING-UNQALIFIED DEPOSITARY OF PUBLIC FUNDS-TRUST RELA-
TIONSHiF BETWEEN BANK AND DEPosITOR-[Missouri] .- Plaintiff, a school
district, deposited public funds with a bank which had not qualified as a
depositary of public funds under the applicable state statutes." The bank
and defendant sureties executed and issued a bond covering "* * * * all of
the funds of the School District, including funds belonging to said Dis-
trict * * *..2 The bank failed, and plaintiff sued defendant sureties for
the amount of the bond, less partial payments already received from the
bank's estate. On appeal from a judgment for plaintiff, defendants con-
tended that considsration for their bond had failed, since the deposit, being
illegal, created a trustee-cestui que trust relation, and not the debtor-
creditor relation contemplated by the parties when they executed the bond.
Held: If the sureties had given merely a statutory bond, they would not
have been liable for the illegal deposit. But the terms of the bond, broader
than the statute required, included the risks resulting from a deposit in an
unqualified depositary. School Consolidated District No. l v. Wilson.3
A contract between a bank and a depositor generally creates a debtor-
creditor relation.4 Money deposited with the bank becomes the property of
awards for temporary total disability. In the case of the former, the
amount awarded for a given number of weeks is definite and determines
the amount in dispute. But in the case of the latter, where continued pay-
ments under the award are contingent upon continued disability, only the
amount accrued is determinative, since the court has no assurance that
the disability will continue long enough for the amount in dispute to reach
$7,500 (Platies v. Theodorow Bakery Co. (1933) 334 Mo. 508, 66 S. W.
(2d) 147).
10. Hanley v. Carlo Motor Service Co. (1939) 344 Mo. 267, 126 S. W.
(2d) 229.
11. Marks v. Loewenberg (1916) 143 La. 196, 78 So. 444.
1. R. S. Mo. (1929) sees. 12184-12198, 9362.
2. School Consolidated District No. 10 v. Wilson (Mo. 1939) 135 S. W.
(2d) 349, 353.
3. (Mo. 1939) 135 S. W. (2d) 349.
4. Vandagrift v. Masonic Home (1912) 242 Mo. 138, 145 S. W. 448;
State ex rel. American Auto Ins. Co. v. Gehner (1928) 320 Mo. 702, 8 S. W.
(2d) 1057, 59 A. L. R. 1026; Bank of Republic v. Republic State Bank
(1931) 328 Mo. 848, 42 S. W. (2d) 27; American Sash and Door Co. v.
Commerce Trust Co. (1933) 332 Mo. 98, 56 S. W. (2d) 1034.
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